SERIOUS
(G)
Actual Harm - a resident was hurt due to facility failures
Deficiency F0678
(Tag F0678)
A resident was harmed · This affected 1 resident
**NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY** Based on interview and record review, the facility failed to ensure staff had proper certification for Cardiopulmonary Resuscita...
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**NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY** Based on interview and record review, the facility failed to ensure staff had proper certification for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR- medical interventions used to restore circulatory and/or respiratory function that has ceased), including 2 (Nurses K and I) of 6 reviewed for CPR certification, resulting in the likelihood of residents not receiving adequate life sustaining treatments in the event of a sudden change in condition, potentially affecting all residents choosing to receive CPR.
Review of the medical record reflected Resident #111 (R111) was admitted to the facility on [DATE], with diagnoses that included essential hypertension, Type 2 diabetes with diabetic neuropathy, sleep apnea, and acute respiratory failure. The Minimum Data Set (MDS) history reflected R111 died in the facility on 10/19/23.
Review of a Nurses Note dated 10/20/2023 at 02:14 AM revealed Staff was in doing care with resident prior to bed when residents legs became weak and buckled while staff was assisting resident transferring from recliner to wheelchair. Staff lowered resident to the ground and notified writer @ [at] approximately 2145 [9:45 PM]. Writer went to residents room to assess resident for any injuries or pain and obtain VS [vital signs]. No injuries were noted and resident denied any new pain or concerns since lowered to the ground. Staff went to retrieve hoyer machine (patient lift) and sling to safely transfer resident from floor to his bed. Staff was able to safely hoyer resident from ground, when staff was assisting resident to the bed from hoyer resident started to become blue and unresponsive @ [at] approximately 2155 [9:45 PM]. RSA [Resident Service Aide] stayed with resident while writer called code blue on PA system and other RSA [Resident Service Aide] went to retrieve crash cart and AED (automated external defibrillator). Staff called 911. Nurse supervisor for shift and other nurses came to assist with code, staff placed board under resident and began compressions @2200 [10:00 PM] .EMS [Emergency Medical Services] stooped [sic] compressions and calledtime [sic] of death for resident @ 2253 [10:53 PM] on 10/19/2023 . The author of the Nurses Note was Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) K.
Review of the medical record reflected R111 was a full code (full resuscitation and life sustaining treatment). The Physician's Orders reflected the code status document was effective 10/6/22.
Review of the Incident Report dated 10/19/23 created by LPN K reflected a brief summary of R111's fall and stated that the writer (LPN K) assessed R111 for injuries, pain, obtained vital signs, and assessed R111's neurological status immediately. No evidence of any assessment was located on the incident report.
On 11/14/23 at 2:58 PM, Resident Service Aide (RSA) G reported that she was R111's RSA on the night that he passed (10/19/23). RSA G reported that R111 was not at his normal baseline that night, R111 was falling asleep while consuming his dinner and could not grasp his cups and utensils while self-feeding. R111 had requested to go to bed so RSA G and RSA H placed a gait belt on R111 and attempted to stand him. While attempting to stand and transfer to the bed, R111's knees buckled and R111 was lowered to the floor by RSA G and RSA H. RSA H left the room to retrieve LPN K so she could assess R111 after he sustained the fall. RSA G stated that when R111 was in the Hoyer sling being lifted to his bed, his face turned blue and it appeared that he was foaming at the mouth. RSA G said she immediately knew something was wrong. RSA G reported that she tried to get R111 out of the sling and onto the bed as quickly as possible. LPN K left the room, meanwhile RSA G was screaming R11's name and rubbing his chest in attempt to elicit a response with no avail. When LPN K didn't return, RSA H left the room in attempt to get staff assistance. While RSA G was waiting in the room she overhead a page from LPN K which stated all nurses report to [unit R111 resided on]. RSA G stated that R111 did not appear to be breathing and was staring at the ceiling, not blinking. LPN K did not immediately return to the room to render care to R111.
On 11/14/23 at 3:19 PM, Resident Service Aide (RSA) H stated that he was present when R111 fell and experienced a medical emergency. RSA H stated that R111 seemed a little out of it that night and witnessed R111 shaking, dropping items, and not wanting to eat his dinner. RSA H was assisting RSA G with transferring R111 to the bathroom before bed when R111 appeared to be shaking, unable to ambulate, and unable to hold his body weight. RSA G and H lowered R111 to the floor and retrieved LPN K. RSA H left the room to obtain the Hoyer lift so R111 could be lifted from the floor and into bed. RSA H returned with the Hoyer lift and while transferring him to the bed with the Hoyer lift, RSA H recalled looking at R111's face and noticed him turning blue. RSA H quickly attempted to get R111 onto the bed and LPN K rushed out of the room. RSA H stated that after some time, he had to leave the room and tell LPN K that the situation was serious and R111 was not breathing. RSA H stated that he left to retrieve the crash cart and when he returned, there were more staff present in the room including LPN K. RSA H stated that the staff removed the back board from the crash cart, placed it underneath R111 and then started chest compression.
In a telephone interview on 11/15/23 at 12:49 PM, RSA N stated that she was across the hallway providing care when she exited the room into the hallway and observed RSA G in the doorway asking where LPN K was. RSA N stated that R111 was motionless on the bed and had a grey appearance. RSA N stated she observed RSA H obtaining the crash cart which prompted her to run to obtain the AED. RSA N stated that LPN K was not in the room with RSA G initially but did state that LPN K came back into R111's room but left again.
In a telephone interview on 11/15/23 at 2:09 PM, Licensed Practical Nurse I stated that she was working on 10/19/23 and responded to R111's medical emergency. LPN I stated she was working on a different unit that night and heard a page overhead which stated, all nurses go to [unit R111 resided on]. LPN I stated that she walked that way unsure which room to report to but observed a few staff outside of R111's room. When LPN I arrived to R111's room, LPN K and a few RSA's were in the room. She noticed that R111 was on the bed and not breathing. LPN I instructed a staff member to call 911 and the asked the RSA's to retrieve the AED. LPN I stated that when the crash cart arrived, staff removed the backboard, place it under R111 and LPN I started chest compressions. When asked where LPN I obtained her Basic Lifesaving Support (BLS) certification, LPN I stated that she took an online class for her BLS certification and did not have to provide any hands-on demonstration.
In a telephone interview on 11/15/23 at 4:15, Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) J reported she was working on 10/19/23. LPN J reported hearing a page overhead and responded to the unit R111 resided on. When she arrived at the room LPN K and I were present and standing in the room. LPN J reported R111 appeared pulseless and blue/gray in color. LPN J stated that someone came with the crash cart, the backboard was removed, and R111's shirt was cut before starting chest compressions.
In a telephone interview on 11/15/23 at 4:39 PM, Licensed Practical Nurse K confirmed that she was working on 10/19/23 and was the nurse assigned to R111. LPN K stated that in report it was mentioned that R111 was not feeling well that day and struggled with abnormally high blood glucose levels and had poor food acceptance. LPN K stated that upon hearing that R111 was lowered to the floor, she came in and assisted with RSA G and H. LPN K stated that she obtained a set of vital signs while R111 was on the floor and recalls that the blood pressure was a little high and the oxygen saturation reading was down to 86%. LPN K stated that RSA G and H proceeded to place R111 in the Hoyer lift and transfer his bed when she noticed that he started to go blue and not respond when she yelled his name. When asked why LPN K left the room she stated that she left to check and ensure R111 was a code blue (full code), announce a code blue on the overhead paging system, and look for oxygen. When asked why LPN K left the room a second time, LPN K stated she left the room to call the family. When LPN K returned to the room after leaving it the second time, staff members were beginning to respond and bring the crash cart and AED. LPN K stated that upon entry to the room the second time, R111 was still blue and cardiopulmonary resuscitation efforts still had not been started. When asked if any vitals were obtained after the fall and during the code, LPN K stated that the assessment and vitals should be documented on the Incident Report. When asked what method was used to obtain her Basic Life Support (BLS) certification, LPN K stated that she took an online class for her BLS certification and did not have to provide any hands-on demonstration.
Review of the Physician Order set for R111 revealed an order which stated Standing Orders okay.
Review of the policy titled Standing Orders with an origination date of 02/2022 and a revised date of 11/2023 reflected the Standing Orders approved by the Medical Director. One of the Standing Orders in the facilities policy stated Oxygen per nasal cannula or mask 2LPM PRN [2 liters per minute as needed] for breathing difficulty and O2 SAT [oxygen saturation] below 90. Notify provider for further orders . LPN K reported that R111's oxygen saturation was 86% after the fall, however, there was no documentation provided that reflected oxygen was administered to R111 as ordered.
Review of the Video Surveillance footage from 10/19/23 revealed the following observations:
9:44:40 PM: RSA G and H enter the room together to provide care to R111
9:59:38 PM: LPN K enters the room with the vitals machine
10:05:46 PM: LPN K quickly exits the room and runs toward the nurses station
10:07:02 PM: RSA H exits room pushing a wheelchair towards nurse direction. RSA H stops and appears to shout something toward the direction that LPN K went. RSA H reenters room. Moments later, RSA H exits the room pushing the Hoyer lift out of the room and walks down the hallway toward the direction of LPN K.
10:08:21 PM: RSA N exits room across from R111's room and looks down hall toward LPN K. RSA G exits the room and speaks to RSA N prompting her to urgently enter the room of R111.
10:08:48 PM: LPN K appears and is running down the hallway with an oxygen concentrator
10:08:56 PM: LPN I enters the room of R111
10:09:13 PM: LPN K exits the room, holding onto the vitals machine and faces the room. LPN K is pointing down the hallway. RSA N exits the room and appears to be speaking to LPN K. LPN I also exits the room. The vitals machine remains in the hallway.
10:09:21 PM: LPN K exits the room and runs down the hallway toward nurses station
10:09:23 PM: LPN I reenters the room
10:09:35 PM: RSA H enters the room with the crash cart
10:09:42 PM: LPN J enters the room
10:09:56 PM: LPN K reenters the room
10:10:03 PM: RSA H exits the room
10:10:22 PM: RSA G exits the room
10:20:38 PM: Emergency Medical Services arrive
In an interview on 11/15/23 at 10:11 AM, Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) L stated that he is a unit manager for the facility, and also helps reviews falls. When inquiring about the fall and medical emergency for R111, LPN L stated that he would be responsible for reviewing the fall but there was not a lot to go off of for the investigation because there was no documentation of an assessment including vital signs from the fall R111 sustained prior to going unresponsive. When queried what the protocol would be if he encountered a situation in which a resident went blue and unresponsive, LPN L stated that the procedure would be to conduct an assessment to include breathing and pulse. If the resident was pulseless, LPN L would call for help and start chest compressions immediately.
In an interview on 11/16/23 at 9:11 AM, Registered Nurse and Clinical Nurse Educator (RN) M stated that she has been conducting mock code blue exercises in the building recently, the first one being held on 10/31/23. When asked what the proper procedure is for code blue situations, RN M stated that when staff see someone that is turning blue and unresponsive, they need to check for a pulse, start compression, yell at an RSA or other staff member to call code blue overhead, and call 911. All staff need to come that can but typically it's one RSA from the hallways that grab the crash cart and go to that area. The first nurse on scene is the charge nurse . have someone confirm they are full code, the nurse will verify no pulse, no respirations, call for help and begin CPR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation) .a RSA or nurse can be the clinical recorder. RN M explained that the crash carts have a code blue sheet on them which is to be utilized in the event a code blue situation arises, and code documentation needs to be obtained. RN M stated that all nurses were required to have a current and proper Basic Life Support (BLS) certification which included the course and hands-on demonstration. When queried if LPN K and LPN I had their BLS certification RN M stated that they received their BLS certification outside of the facility. RN M later confirmed that LPN K and LPN I had not completed their hands-on BLS demonstration which meant their current BLS certification was invalid.
In an interview on 11/16/23 at 10:02 AM, Director of Nursing (DON) B reported that if an unresponsive resident needs help, whoever the first one to respond stays with patient, and use light or call out in hallway for help and ask for them to get code cart and AED. The nurse should stay with the patient and start compressions. The staff that goes to get the equipment should call overhead as well for more help . DON B stated that it would not be appropriate to wait for the backboard to arrive before starting chest compressions. DON B stated that the code involving R111 was discussed, and some concerns were identified. When queried what concerns were identified, DON B stated that LPN K should not have left the room and that the RSA should have been sent to gather more help. DON B also stated that the lack of documentation was also an identified concern, so the facility recently started implementing Mock Code Blue training. DON B also acknowledged that the two LPN's (K and I) did not have their proper Basic Life Support (BLS) certification which meant that they were unqualified to perform proper Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation on R111.
CONCERN
(D)
📢 Someone Reported This
A family member, employee, or ombudsman was alarmed enough to file a formal complaint
Potential for Harm - no one hurt, but risky conditions existed
Report Alleged Abuse
(Tag F0609)
Could have caused harm · This affected 1 resident
**NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY** Resident #312 (R312)
Review of the medical record revealed that Resident #312 (R312) was admitted to facility 4/18/2017 with dia...
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**NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY** Resident #312 (R312)
Review of the medical record revealed that Resident #312 (R312) was admitted to facility 4/18/2017 with diagnoses including severe vascular dementia with mood disturbance, major depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder. Review of the Minimum Data Set (MDS) with an Assessment Reference Date (ARD) of 6/20/23 reflected that R312 had a Brief Interview for Mental Status (BIMS-a cognitive screening tool) score of 3 (severe cognitive impairment). Further review of the medical record reflected that R312 was discharged to the hospital on 8/7/23 and did not return.
Review of the Facility Reported Incident reflected Date/Time Incident Occurred: 3/18/23, Date/Time Incident Discovered: 3/20/2023 8:15 AM. Incident Summary within same report revealed According to resident service aide, [Resident Service Aide (RSA) E], [RSA E] and another resident service aide, [RSA F] was in resident [R312's] room providing care. [R312] was being aggressive with [RSA F]. [RSA F] stated to [R312], If you are going to be mean to me, I am going to be mean to you. Once care was finished, as the two aides were exiting the room, [RSA F] said, You're so mean to me. I hope your cat (stuffed cat) pees on you. [RSA F] then hit [R312's] stuffed cat.
In a telephone interview on 11/14/23 at 11:18 AM, RSA E stated that she had been employed at the facility from the beginning of January 2023 to approximately the end of March 2023, confirmed familiarity with R312, and stated that R312 was one that had to be talked to in a certain way as she was a little hesitant with cares, resistant with changing and dressing and had to be a little cautious with as she would strike out and swear when being changed. RSA E stated that on the 3/17/23 night shift she was being trained by RSA F and that toward the end of that same shift, on 3/18/23 at approximately 4:00 AM, while she and RSA F were trying to change R312, R312 began swearing, grabbing, and scratching at RSA F. RSA E stated that RSA F began taunting R312 by sticking her tongue out at her, telling her that she was mean, saying that if she hit her again she would hit her stuffed cat and that she hoped her cat would pee on her, and stated that from what she could recall, RSA F did end up hitting her cat. RSA E stated that she initially thought that RSA F was joking with R312 but as RSA F repeatedly taunted R312, said mean things to her, verbally insulted her, and then hit her cat, she realized that what she witnessed could be considered abuse. RSA E stated that she distracted and redirected R312 so that she would focus on her instead of RSA F and that they were then able to finish R312's care. RSA E stated that both she and RSA F exited R312's room and that she made a mental note to herself to report what she had witnessed as she didn't know exactly what to do as she was newer, didn't know if she could tell the nurse, as thought that she had to tell the boss so as not to involve the floor nurse. RSA E stated that the end of the shift was hectic, she left work without reporting the potential abuse that she had witnessed, returned home, and went to bed. RSA E stated that later that same day (3/18/23), although she could not recall a specific time frame, she either sent a text or an email to Human Resource Specialist (HRS) D to inquire what she should do if she witnessed abuse on a weekend. RSA E stated that she then received a phone call from HRS D on the following Monday (3/20/23) morning, that she went to the facility to complete a report about what she had witnessed, and that she received training regarding identifying and reporting abuse a few days later. RSA E stated that from that training she learned something that she had not known and that she had messed up as she should have reported the abuse that she had witnessed on 3/18/23 immediately to whomever was in charge at that time. RSA E stated that she thought she had received training regarding abuse identification and reporting upon hire to the facility in January 2023 and then again in March but that the education was brief and she couldn't recall the exact training provided but stated that she thought she had to take a quiz regarding abuse reporting with both training's.
Review of email correspondence dated March 18, 2023, at 5:55 PM, from RSA E to HRS D stated, I need to report something about witnessing a coworker use abuse towards an elder. How do I go about doing that on a weekend?
Review of email correspondence dated March 20, 2023, at 7:30 AM, from HRS D to RSA E stated, You need to report any type of abuse to your nurse immediately no matter when it is. Please call me ASAP [as soon as possible] so that I can get the information from you regarding what you witnessed as this is very important.
In a telephone interview on 11/14/23 at 3:20 PM, HRS D stated that she did not work weekends, did not always check her emails on the weekends and that from what she could recall, upon arriving to work on Monday, 3/20/23, she had received a potential allegation of abuse from RSA E via email dated 3/18/23. HRS D stated that she immediately reported the allegation to Corporate Compliance & Quality Assurance Director (CC/QAD) C, responded back to RSA E regarding the proper channels to report abuse, and requested that RSA E come to the facility to provide a written report of the allegation. HRS D stated that she did not normally receive abuse allegations via email and that staff knew to report any suspected abuse immediately to nurse or Nursing Home Administrator (NHA) A so that immediate follow up could be completed.
In an interview on 11/14/23 at 4:20 PM, CC/QAD C stated that NHA A was the abuse coordinator but that if NHA A was unavailable for any reason, that any allegation of abuse would be reported directly to her, and that she would coordinate with NHA A, if needed, and begin an investigation. CC/QAD C stated that that per the facility's abuse policy that if any staff identified anything that could be potential abuse, resident safety would first be assured, a supervisor would be notified and then NHA A would be immediately notified for further direction. CC/QAD C further stated that all staff were able to call NHA A directly to report potential abuse but that frequently the RSA's reported directly to the nurse supervisor and then the supervisor reported to NHA A which was acceptable as long as the potential abuse was reported immediately upon identification.
Upon review of the Facility Reported Investigation, CC/QAD C stated that she was alerted to the potential allegation of abuse on 3/20/23 upon arrival to work by HRS D, that HRS D communicated with RSA E via phone to obtain an initial statement and that RSA E then came to the facility that same date to provide a written statement. CC/QAD C stated that an investigation was initiated immediately based on HRS D's telephone interview with RSA E and that the incident was submitted to the State Agency. CC/QAD C confirmed that the alleged abuse incident occurred 3/18/23 and as was reported via email was not discovered until 3/20/23 at 8:15 AM and was not submitted to the State Agency until 3/20/23 at 8:42 AM.
CC/QAD C acknowledged that RSA E had received education regarding the facility's abuse policy upon hire and follow up education on 3/14/23 but that RSA E may have hesitated to report the alleged abuse as she was timid and potentially intimated by more experienced RSA F.
In an interview on 11/14/23 at 4:59 PM, NHA A acknowledged that the expectation would be that any potential allegation of abuse be reported immediately to the direct supervisor and/or the abuse coordinator so that an investigation could be promptly initiated and any needed follow up completed. NHA A further stated that RSA E and all staff received reeducation regarding abuse identification and reporting following the 3/18/23 incident.
Review of RSA E's personnel file indicated a date of hire of 1/4/23. A form tilted Abuse Policy Acknowledgement signed and dated by RSA E on 1/4/2023 stated, I have read and understand the facilities abuse policy as it was presented to me in orientation. I acknowledge my immediate concern is for the safety of the elder/resident and removing them from potential harm. I will immediately inform the household nurse of the potential abuse and then contact the Abuse Coordinator, [Nursing Home Administrator (NHA) A]. I understand I will need to fill out a Witness Statement containing the facts of the potential abuse. A separate quiz titled Abuse and Neglect dated 1/4/2023 was noted to be completed by RSA E. A form titled Human Resources Department Employee General Orientation Checklist within RSA E's file was also noted to include Employee In-Service Training .[Facility Name's] Abuse Prevention and Intervention Program - 1 Hour initialed by RSA E as completed and signed/dated by RSA E on 1/5/2023.
Document titled Education regarding reportable incident on 1-18-2023 & 1-19-2023 Education for All Staff stated, Any suspicion of abuse must be reported immediately to a supervisor/nurse with associated Quiz for the Reporting abuse education noted to be completed and signed by RSA E with a date of 3/14/22 (date clarified as 3/14/23 by RSA E and by CC/QAD C during separate interviews). Despite the receipt of abuse education and reporting by RSA E at facility hire and again just 4 days prior (on 3/14/23) to the witnessed alleged abuse on 3/18/23, RSA E reported the allegation of potential abuse via email greater than 12 hours after the event had been witnessed.
Review of the facility policy titled, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation with an 8/2023 revised date stated, Policy Statement: It is the policy of this facility to provide protections for the health, welfare, and rights of each resident by developing and implementing written policies and procedures that prohibit and prevent abuse, neglect, exploitation, and misappropriation of resident property .G. Reporting/Response .1. The facility will have written procedures that include: a. Reporting of all alleged violation to the Administrator or designee, state agency .within specified time frames: i. Immediately, but no later than 2 hours after the allegation is made, if the events that cause the allegation involve abuse or result in serious bodily injury .
This citation pertains to intake numbers MI00136522 and MI00135497.
Based on interview and record review the facility failed to ensure for two out of six residents (Residents 312 and 313) allegations of abuse were reported immediately to the abuse coordinator and state agency resulting in the potential for alleged and/or actual abuse to not be reported.
Findings Included:
Resident #313 (R313):
R313 no longer resided at the facility.
Per R313's Electronic Medical Record (EMR) R313 was [AGE] years old with a diagnosis of dementia.
Review of a Facility Reported Incident (FRI) revealed Resident Service Aid (RSA) P was attending a training class on 1/19/2023, and when abuse and neglect were discussed RSA P recalled an incident that had occurred on 1/11/2023. The FRI revealed that RSA P reported to Registered Nurse (RN) M, who was the staff educator, that she witnessed abuse that she did not report. Further review of the FRI revealed RSA P reported to RN M that on 1/11/2023 she was sitting at the nurses' station when she overheard RSA Q say to R313, (R313) you stop that sh*t; there is no cat in there. So annoying, and then walk out of R313's room.
Review of RSA P's EMPLOYEE IN-SERVICE TRAINING dated 10/20/2022, revealed RSA P had received training in an in-service on, .Abuse Prevention and Intervention Program .
In an interview on 11/14/2023 at 3:59 PM, RSA P stated that she did not report the abuse she witnessed, because she was not fully aware of the facility's process for reporting alleged or actual abuse. RSA P said while she was sitting at the nurses' station she heard RSA Q, who was in R313's room, loudly say the R313 that there was no cat in here, and then said stop that shit there are no cats. RSA P said she had forgotten to tell the nurse she was working with.
During the same interview RSA P said she was going to ask two other employees what she should do, but got to busy and forgot before she ended her shift.
In an interview on 11/16/2023 at 08:20 AM, RN M stated that she was talking about abuse at the beginning of the training class. RN M said at the break RSA P told her about the abuse allegation that occurred on 1/11/2023. RN M said RSA P told her that she did not want to get anyone in trouble, and did not know what to do. RN M said RSA P had full abuse training upon her hire.
In an interview on 1/15/2023 at 9:33 AM, RSA Q stated that nothing happened on 1/11/2023 when she cared for R313. RSA Q said she did not say anything to R313 regarding cats, and said R313 was afraid of cats. RSA Q said the facility had cats but the cats did not usually come into the hall R313 resided on. RSA Q said she did not recall what she said to R313 on 1/11/2023, but stated that she must have said that the R313 because the facility said she did.
Review of RSA Q's education on abuse revealed that on 3/11/2022 RSA Q had received training on abuse that included recognizing, reporting, and prevention. Also on 6/25/20222 RSA Q was educated again on abuse.
Review of the incident reported to the state agency revealed that the incident occurred on 1/11/2023, but was not reported to the state agency until 1/19/2023.
Review of the facility policy and procedure dated 5/2021 and revised 8/2023, revealed on page six and seven, The facility will have written procedures that include:
a. Reporting of all alleged violations to the Administrator or designee, state agency, adult protective services, and all other required agencies (e.g., law enforcement when applicable) within specified time frames:
i. Immediately, but not later than 2 hours after the allegation is made, if the events that cause the allegation involve abuse or result in serious bodily injury, or
Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation.
ii. Not later than 24 hours if the events that cause the allegation do not involve abuse and do not result in serious bodily injury.
CONCERN
(D)
Potential for Harm - no one hurt, but risky conditions existed
Comprehensive Care Plan
(Tag F0656)
Could have caused harm · This affected 1 resident
**NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY** Based on interview and record review the facility failed to ensure a comprehensive care plan was in place for one out of 22 resi...
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**NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY** Based on interview and record review the facility failed to ensure a comprehensive care plan was in place for one out of 22 residents (Resident 313), resulting in the potential for care needs to not be met.
Findings Included:
Resident #313 (R313) no longer resided at the facility.
Per R313's Electronic Medical Record (EMR) R313 was [AGE] years old with a diagnosis of dementia.
Review of a Facility Reported Incident (FRI) revealed Resident Service Aid (RSA) P reported to RN M that on 1/11/2023 she was sitting at the nurses' station when she overheard RSA Q say to R313, (R313) you stop that shit; there is no cat in there. So annoying, and then walk out of R313's room.
In an interview on 11/14/2023 at 3:59 PM, RSA P said while she was sitting at the nurses' station she heard RSA Q, who was in R313's room, loudly say the R313 that there was no cat in here, and then said stop that shit there are no cats.
In an interview on 1/15/2023 at 9:33 AM, RSA Q stated that R313 was afraid of cats. RSA Q said the facility had cats but the cats did not usually come into the hall R313 resided on.
Review of a progress note dated 9/6/2022 revealed, RSA and Nurse both noted elder asking about a cat and requesting it not be on her bed or in her room. Staff has not noted a cat in this elders room, nor a cat in her bed when she requests for it to be taken off her bed .
Review of a written witness statement from RSA Q dated 1/19/2023, revealed RSA Q stated that R313 was afraid of cats, and would put her call light on several times regarding cats being in her room.
Review of an incident summary revealed RSA Q had made a statement that R313 was always afraid of cats being in her room, would put her call light on several times about a cat in her room, and had caught R313 going to her closet to chase cat out.
Review of R313's care plans revealed there was no care plan in place that identified the concern R313 had with a fear cats, nor were there any interventions in place that addressed R313's fear of cats and thinking cats were in her room.
CONCERN
(D)
Potential for Harm - no one hurt, but risky conditions existed
Quality of Care
(Tag F0684)
Could have caused harm · This affected 1 resident
**NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY** Based on observation, interview, and record review, the facility failed to complete an assessment, properly document a critical ...
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**NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY** Based on observation, interview, and record review, the facility failed to complete an assessment, properly document a critical medical emergency, and ensure cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was performed timely by competent staff and according to standards of practice for one (Resident #111) of two reviewed for quality of care, resulting in delayed identification of a change in condition, a delay in CPR, ineffective CPR efforts, and ultimately death in R111.
Findings Include:
Review of the medical record reflected Resident #111 (R111) was admitted to the facility on [DATE], with diagnoses that included essential hypertension, Type 2 diabetes with diabetic neuropathy, sleep apnea, and acute respiratory failure. The Minimum Data Set (MDS) history reflected R111 died in the facility on 10/19/23.
Review of a Nurses Note dated 10/20/2023 at 02:14 AM revealed Staff was in doing care with resident prior to bed when residents legs became weak and buckled while staff was assisting resident transferring from recliner to wheelchair. Staff lowered resident to the ground and notified writer @ [at] approximately 2145 [9:45 PM]. Writer went to residents room to assess resident for any injuries or pain and obtain VS [vital signs]. No injuries were noted and resident denied any new pain or concerns since lowered to the ground. Staff went to retrieve hoyer machine (patient lift) and sling to safely transfer resident from floor to his bed. Staff was able to safely hoyer resident from ground, when staff was assisting resident to the bed from hoyer resident started to become blue and unresponsive @ [at] approximately 2155 [9:45 PM]. RSA [Resident Service Aide] stayed with resident while writer called code blue on PA system and other RSA [Resident Service Aide] went to retrieve crash cart and AED (automated external defibrillator). Staff called 911. Nurse supervisor for shift and other nurses came to assist with code, staff placed board under resident and began compressions @2200 [10:00 PM] .EMS [Emergency Medical Services] stooped [sic] compressions and calledtime [sic] of death for resident @ 2253 [10:53 PM] on 10/19/2023 . The author of the Nurses Note was Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) K.
Review of the medical record reflected R111 was a full code (full resuscitation and life sustaining treatment). The Physician's Orders reflected the code status document was effective 10/6/22.
Review of the Incident Report dated 10/19/23 created by LPN K reflected a brief summary of R111's fall and stated that the writer (LPN K) assessed R111 for injuries, pain, obtained vital signs, and assessed R111's neurological status immediately. No evidence of any assessment was located on the incident report.
On 11/14/23 at 2:58 PM, Resident Service Aide (RSA) G reported that she was R111's RSA on the night that he passed (10/19/23). RSA G reported that R111 was not at his normal baseline that night, R111 was falling asleep while consuming his dinner and could not grasp his cups and utensils while self-feeding. R111 had requested to go to bed so RSA G and RSA H placed a gait belt on R111 and attempted to stand him. While attempting to stand and transfer to the bed, R111's knees buckled and R111 was lowered to the floor by RSA G and RSA H. RSA H left the room to retrieve LPN K so she could assess R111 after he sustained the fall. RSA G stated that when R111 was in the Hoyer sling being lifted to his bed, his face turned blue and it appeared that he was foaming at the mouth. RSA G said she immediately knew something was wrong. RSA G reported that she tried to get R111 out of the sling and onto the bed as quickly as possible. LPN K left the room, meanwhile RSA G was screaming R11's name and rubbing his chest in attempt to elicit a response with no avail. When LPN K didn't return, RSA H left the room in attempt to get staff assistance. While RSA G was waiting in the room she overhead a page from LPN K which stated all nurses report to [unit R111 resided on]. RSA G stated that R111 did not appear to be breathing and was staring at the ceiling, not blinking. LPN K did not immediately return to the room to render care to R111.
On 11/14/23 at 3:19 PM, Resident Service Aide (RSA) H stated that he was present when R111 fell and experienced a medical emergency. RSA H stated that R111 seemed a little out of it that night and witnessed R111 shaking, dropping items, and not wanting to eat his dinner. RSA H was assisting RSA G with transferring R111 to the bathroom before bed when R111 appeared to be shaking, unable to ambulate, and unable to hold his body weight. RSA G and H lowered R111 to the floor and retrieved LPN K. RSA H left the room to obtain the Hoyer lift so R111 could be lifted from the floor and into bed. RSA H returned with the Hoyer lift and while transferring him to the bed with the Hoyer lift, RSA H recalled looking at R111's face and noticed him turning blue. RSA H quickly attempted to get R111 onto the bed and LPN K rushed out of the room. RSA H stated that after some time, he had to leave the room and tell LPN K that the situation was serious and R111 was not breathing. RSA H stated that he left to retrieve the crash cart and when he returned, there were more staff present in the room including LPN K. RSA H stated that the staff removed the back board from the crash cart, placed it underneath R111 and then started chest compression.
In a telephone interview on 11/15/23 at 12:49 PM, RSA N stated that she was across the hallway providing care when she exited the room into the hallway and observed RSA G in the doorway asking where LPN K was. RSA N stated that R111 was motionless on the bed and had a grey appearance. RSA N stated she observed RSA H obtaining the crash cart which prompted her to run to obtain the AED. RSA N stated that LPN K was not in the room with RSA G initially but did state that LPN K came back into R111's room but left again.
In a telephone interview on 11/15/23 at 2:09 PM, Licensed Practical Nurse I stated that she was working on 10/19/23 and responded to R111's medical emergency. LPN I stated she was working on a different unit that night and heard a page overhead which stated, all nurses go to [unit R111 resided on]. LPN I stated that she walked that way unsure which room to report to but observed a few staff outside of R111's room. When LPN I arrived to R111's room, LPN K and a few RSA's were in the room. She noticed that R111 was on the bed and not breathing. LPN I instructed a staff member to call 911 and the asked the RSA's to retrieve the AED. LPN I stated that when the crash cart arrived, staff removed the backboard, place it under R111 and LPN I started chest compressions. When asked where LPN I obtained her Basic Lifesaving Support (BLS) certification, LPN I stated that she took an online class for her BLS certification and did not have to provide any hands-on demonstration.
In a telephone interview on 11/15/23 at 4:15, Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) J reported she was working on 10/19/23. LPN J reported hearing a page overhead and responded to the unit R111 resided on. When she arrived at the room LPN K and I were present and standing in the room. LPN J reported R111 appeared pulseless and blue/gray in color. LPN J stated that someone came with the crash cart, the backboard was removed, and R111's shirt was cut before starting chest compressions.
In a telephone interview on 11/15/23 at 4:39 PM, Licensed Practical Nurse K confirmed that she was working on 10/19/23 and was the nurse assigned to R111. LPN K stated that in report it was mentioned that R111 was not feeling well that day and struggled with abnormally high blood glucose levels and had poor food acceptance. LPN K stated that upon hearing that R111 was lowered to the floor, she came in and assisted with RSA G and H. LPN K stated that she obtained a set of vital signs while R111 was on the floor and recalls that the blood pressure was a little high and the oxygen saturation reading was down to 86%. LPN K stated that RSA G and H proceeded to place R111 in the Hoyer lift and transfer his bed when she noticed that he started to go blue and not respond when she yelled his name. When asked why LPN K left the room she stated that she left to check and ensure R111 was a code blue (full code), announce a code blue on the overhead paging system, and look for oxygen. When asked why LPN K left the room a second time, LPN K stated she left the room to call the family. When LPN K returned to the room after leaving it the second time, staff members were beginning to respond and bring the crash cart and AED. LPN K stated that upon entry to the room the second time, R111 was still blue and cardiopulmonary resuscitation efforts still had not been started. When asked if any vitals were obtained after the fall and during the code, LPN K stated that the assessment and vitals should be documented on the Incident Report. When asked what method was used to obtain her Basic Life Support (BLS) certification, LPN K stated that she took an online class for her BLS certification and did not have to provide any hands-on demonstration.
Review of the Physician Order set for R111 revealed an order which stated Standing Orders okay.
Review of the policy titled Standing Orders with an origination date of 02/2022 and a revised date of 11/2023 reflected the Standing Orders approved by the Medical Director. One of the Standing Orders in the facilities policy stated Oxygen per nasal cannula or mask 2LPM PRN [2 liters per minute as needed] for breathing difficulty and O2 SAT [oxygen saturation] below 90. Notify provider for further orders . LPN K reported that R111's oxygen saturation was 86% after the fall, however, there was no documentation provided that reflected oxygen was administered to R111 as ordered.
Review of the Video Surveillance footage from 10/19/23 revealed the following observations:
9:44:40 PM: RSA G and H enter the room together to provide care to R111
9:59:38 PM: LPN K enters the room with the vitals machine
10:05:46 PM: LPN K quickly exits the room and runs toward the nurses station
10:07:02 PM: RSA H exits room pushing a wheelchair towards nurse direction. RSA H stops and appears to shout something toward the direction that LPN K went. RSA H reenters room. Moments later, RSA H exits the room pushing the Hoyer lift out of the room and walks down the hallway toward the direction of LPN K.
10:08:21 PM: RSA N exits room across from R111's room and looks down hall toward LPN K. RSA G exits the room and speaks to RSA N prompting her to urgently enter the room of R111.
10:08:48 PM: LPN K appears and is running down the hallway with an oxygen concentrator
10:08:56 PM: LPN I enters the room of R111
10:09:13 PM: LPN K exits the room, holding onto the vitals machine and faces the room. LPN K is pointing down the hallway. RSA N exits the room and appears to be speaking to LPN K. LPN I also exits the room. The vitals machine remains in the hallway.
10:09:21 PM: LPN K exits the room and runs down the hallway toward nurses station
10:09:23 PM: LPN I reenters the room
10:09:35 PM: RSA H enters the room with the crash cart
10:09:42 PM: LPN J enters the room
10:09:56 PM: LPN K reenters the room
10:10:03 PM: RSA H exits the room
10:10:22 PM: RSA G exits the room
10:20:38 PM: Emergency Medical Services arrive
In an interview on 11/15/23 at 10:11 AM, Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) L stated that he is a unit manager for the facility, and also helps reviews falls. When inquiring about the fall and medical emergency for R111, LPN L stated that he would be responsible for reviewing the fall but there was not a lot to go off of for the investigation because there was no documentation of an assessment including vital signs from the fall R111 sustained prior to going unresponsive. When queried what the protocol would be if he encountered a situation in which a resident went blue and unresponsive, LPN L stated that the procedure would be to conduct an assessment to include breathing and pulse. If the resident was pulseless, LPN L would call for help and start chest compressions immediately.
In an interview on 11/16/23 at 9:11 AM, Registered Nurse and Clinical Nurse Educator (RN) M stated that she has been conducting mock code blue exercises in the building recently, the first one being held on 10/31/23. When asked what the proper procedure is for code blue situations, RN M stated that when staff see someone that is turning blue and unresponsive, they need to check for a pulse, start compression, yell at an RSA or other staff member to call code blue overhead, and call 911. All staff need to come that can but typically it's one RSA from the hallways that grab the crash cart and go to that area. The first nurse on scene is the charge nurse . have someone confirm they are full code, the nurse will verify no pulse, no respirations, call for help and begin CPR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation) .a RSA or nurse can be the clinical recorder. RN M explained that the crash carts have a code blue sheet on them which is to be utilized in the event a code blue situation arises, and code documentation needs to be obtained. RN M stated that all nurses were required to have a current and proper Basic Life Support (BLS) certification which included the course and hands-on demonstration. When queried if LPN K and LPN I had their BLS certification RN M stated that they received their BLS certification outside of the facility. RN M later confirmed that LPN K and LPN I had not completed their hands-on BLS demonstration which meant their current BLS certification was invalid.
In an interview on 11/16/23 at 10:02 AM, Director of Nursing (DON) B reported that if an unresponsive resident needs help, whoever the first one to respond stays with patient, and use light or call out in hallway for help and ask for them to get code cart and AED. The nurse should stay with the patient and start compressions. The staff that goes to get the equipment should call overhead as well for more help . DON B stated that it would not be appropriate to wait for the backboard to arrive before starting chest compressions. DON B stated that the code involving R111 was discussed, and some concerns were identified. When queried what concerns were identified, DON B stated that LPN K should not have left the room and that the RSA should have been sent to gather more help. DON B also stated that the lack of documentation was also an identified concern, so the facility recently started implementing Mock Code Blue training. DON B also acknowledged that the two LPN's (K and I) did not have their proper Basic Life Support (BLS) certification which meant that they were unqualified to perform proper Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation on R111.
CONCERN
(D)
Potential for Harm - no one hurt, but risky conditions existed
Accident Prevention
(Tag F0689)
Could have caused harm · This affected 1 resident
**NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY** Based on observation, interview, and record review the facility failed to thoroughly investigate and promptly implement effectiv...
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**NOTE- TERMS IN BRACKETS HAVE BEEN EDITED TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY** Based on observation, interview, and record review the facility failed to thoroughly investigate and promptly implement effective interventions to prevent falls with injuries in one of one residents reviewed for accidents (Resident #34), resulting in fall with fracture and pain.
Findings include:
Resident #34 (R34)
R34 was observed on 11/16/23 at 9:59 AM, lying in bed with left side of bed against the wall and a floor mat on the right side of her bed. An over-the-bed table was next to R34's bed, on top of the floor mat; and a red call light box was on top of her table.
R34's Minimum Data Set (MDS) significant change assessment dated [DATE] introduced a Brief Interview for Mental Status (BIMS), a short performance-based cognitive screener, score of 03 (00-07 Severe Impairment) and required assistance for transfers.
In review of R34's progress notes, she had the diagnoses of anxiety disorder, diabetes mellitus, chronic kidney disease, high blood pressure, depression, insomnia, dementia and heart failure.
In review of incident/accident report dated 5/05/23 at 9:23 PM, staff heard a thud down the hallway at and ran to R34's room and observed her sitting on the floor by her bed. R34 was tearful and stated she slipped and did not know what happened. R34 was transferred from the floor to a recliner chair with a total lift transfer device. No injuries were observed. In review of R34's care plan and incident report, there were no new interventions implemented to prevent future falls.
R34's risk for falls care plan, revised 10/09/23 revealed she had a history of falls related to confusion, gait/balance problems, unawareness of safety needs, dementia, and needed assistance with mobility and transfers.
Progress note dated 7/29/23 at 3:01 PM revealed at 12:35 PM, R34 was observed walking in the dining room unassisted, stumbling toward the opposite side of the dining room. R34 fell face forward onto the floor. R34 was incontinent of bowel at this time and wearing day shoes. R34 had an abrasion and complained of pain to her left knee. R34's nose was bleeding as well as her lip. R34 became more tearful during attempt to transfer her off the floor with a total lift transfer device. R34 complained of left hand pain and x-rays of her hand and left knee were ordered.
Progress note dated 7/29/23 at 4:18 PM revealed R34's x-ray of her left hand revealed degenerative changes of the hand without acute fracture. R34's Left knee x-ray revealed acute patella (kneecap) fracture. R34 was transferred to the hospital.
Progress note dated 7/29/23 at 10:27 PM revealed R34 returned to the facility with an immobilizer for her left knee. The same note indicated a low bed and a floor mat to left side of bed were implemented.
R34's risk for falls care plan revealed an intervention was initiated on 7/31/23 for a low bed with mats due to impulsiveness; but was resolved on the same date.
Progress note dated 7/31/23 at 2:52 PM revealed R34 returned from an orthopedic appointment and had the diagnosis of acute left knee patella fracture. Treatment included left knee immobilizer at all times and pain medication. R34 was to follow-up in 2 weeks.
Progress note dated 8/01/23 at 3:19 PM revealed R34 was observed in the bathroom by herself and was last seen in bed.
Interdisciplinary team (IDT) note dated 8/01/23 at 4:26 PM indicated R34 was to be in a regular height bed with tapered mats for protection related to her history of falls and due to her ability to stand up from her bed. A red soft touch call light had been put into place for the ease of use. Orthostatic blood pressures (drop in blood pressure with position changes) were planned to be assessed.
In review of R34's risk for Falls care plan, a red soft touch call light was implemented on 9/08/23 and canceled on 10/09/23.
Progress note dated 8/02/23 at 10:19 AM revealed R34 got up unassisted and took self into the bathroom.
Progress Note dated 8/03/23 at 7:17 PM revealed staff reported R34 appeared down and depressed daily, tearful and often felt bad about herself.
Progress note dated 8/14/23 at 10:40 PM revealed R34 was getting up unassisted in her room multiple times throughout shift and complaining of pain in her left leg. The same note revealed R34 was very tearful stating nobody liked her and don't leave me here alone.
Progress Note dated 8/16/23 at 9:21 PM revealed R34 had an orthopedic follow-up appointment and instructions included to continue to wear knee immobilizer, assist to the bathroom with 2 person assist, and to follow-up in 2 weeks.
In review of R34's care plan, assist to the bathroom with 2 person assist was not initiated until 9/08/23.
Progress Note dated 8/26/2023 at 2:53 PM revealed R34 was found sitting on the edge of her bed crying and stated she had fallen. A hematoma (blood collection under skin) was noted on the back of her head and orders were received to transfer to the hospital for evaluation and treatment.
Progress Note dated 8/26/23 at 11:15 PM revealed R34 was admitted to the hospital.
Progress Note dated 9/05/23 at 11:35 AM revealed R35 was readmitted to the facility following surgery for a hip fracture.
IDT Progress note dated 9/06/23 5:16 PM revealed R34's fall from 8/26/23 was reviewed and on 9/05/23 R34 was readmitted . A low bed with mats was put into place for safety. admission paperwork from the hospital revealed repair of hip fracture occurred following a fall from a stretcher while hospitalized .
Late Entry Progress Note dated 9/05/23 at 7:12 PM indicated R34 had fallen out of bed at 6:15 PM and was observed lying on the left side of her bed on her right side. R34 was rolled over onto her back and it was noted her incision was bleeding. R34's pulse oximeter reading (measurement of saturation of oxygen in blood cells) was 85 percent (%, normal reading 95 % to 100 %), oxygen was applied at 2 liters. R34 was cold and clammy, and her blood sugar was 318 milligrams per deciliter (mg/dL after meal less than 180 mg/dL was normal). R34 was lethargic and it was difficult to keep her awake. R34 was transferred to the hospital for evaluation.
Progress note dated 9/08/23 at 1:00 PM revealed R34 was re-admitted at the facility.
Physician's Progress Note dated 9/11/23 at 1:00 AM revealed R34 had a recent history of patella fracture, had a fall and was transferred to the hospital for further evaluation, had another fall at the hospital, and had a diagnosis of a right hip fracture and a small subdural hematoma (bleed cause by head injury). R34 underwent surgery, was re-admitted to the facility, had fell again, and was transferred back to the hospital. R34 had acute hypoxic respiratory failure (impairment of gas exchange between the lungs and the blood) and was re-admitted back to the facility.
Licensed Practical Nurse Unit Manager (UM) L was interviewed on 11/16/23 at 8:20 AM and stated after R34 fell on 5/05/23, orthostatic blood pressures were implemented and she had a drop in her blood pressure. UM L did not consider to add to R34's care plan to make position changes slowly to avoid dizziness from blood pressure changes or any other interventions to prevent falls were care planned. UM L stated a beveled walkable floor mat was implemented on 9/28/23. UM L stated after R34's fall on 7/29/23, a low bed with floor mats were implemented; but was unable to locate that date on R34's care plans. UM L stated a silent sensor alarm that activated the call light with changes in position was not considered as they were an alarm free facility.
MINOR
(B)
Minor Issue - procedural, no safety impact
Grievances
(Tag F0585)
Minor procedural issue · This affected multiple residents
Based on observation, interview, and record review the facility failed to ensure grievances were readily accessible in a public location as reported by seven of seven residents during a confidential R...
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Based on observation, interview, and record review the facility failed to ensure grievances were readily accessible in a public location as reported by seven of seven residents during a confidential Resident Council meeting, potentially resulting in unresolved concerns of residents and visitors, unmet needs of residents and their wish to remain anonymous if desired.
Findings include:
During a confidential resident council meeting held on 11/14/2023 at 2:00 PM, seven of seven residents reported that they had to ask a staff member to get them a grievance and the staff member filled it out for them. The residents said, the grievances are behind the nurses' station, they aren't accessible but we can ask a staff member for it.
On 11/14/23 at 01:15 PM, it was observed that none of the nurses' stations and hallways on the second floor had grievances readily accessible. It was also observed that none of the nurses' stations and hallways had grievances readily accessible on the first floor.
During an interview on 11/14/23 at approximately 01:25 PM, Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) O was sitting at the nurses' station and was asked where grievances are kept. LPN O stated that they were kept at the nurses' station and she said she thought it was behind the desk in the file cabinet. LPN O looked for the grievances in the file cabinet and was able to locate it after a minute.
During an interview on 11/15/23 at 09:45 AM, Nursing Home Administrator (NHA) A and Corporate Compliance and Quality Assurance Director (Director) C stated that they used to have grievances in a box on the 1st floor but it's not there anymore and they need to get it back up or at the nurses' stations.
Review of the resident council agenda dated August 18, 2023, revealed the title how to file a grievance with the response of forms are at each nurses' station, any staff member can bring one and help complete if needed.